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The recent state visit to Ireland by Czech President Vaclav Klaus constituted a remarkable deviation from European diplomatic norms when the irascible old Thatcherite cocked a snoop at Brian Cowen’s government by placing the Lisbon Treaty at the centre of his visit, and in the process, created a predictable media storm. In breaking just about every rule in the diplomatic book, Klaus single-handedly re-opened the festering wound of the failed Lisbon referendum and reminded the world of the grave difficulties faced by Mr. Cowen in his effort to come up with an Irish solution to the European constitutional imbroglio.
Observers of the European political scene will readily attest that, when it comes to causing affront and breaking rank, Mr. Klaus has form. He was one of the earliest adherents of the most extreme form of neo-liberal marketization in Central and Eastern Europe, and remains an unrepentant cheerleader for laissez-faire capitalism, even in the aftermath of the devastation caused by the implosion of financial markets this autumn. Throughout the post-communist period he has remained indifferent to the extraordinary suffering wrought by ‘transition’ on the most vulnerable elements of Czech society. He is an emphatic climate change denier. And he remains wedded to Margaret Thatcher’s ‘vision’ of a loose-fitting Europe (laid down in her celebrated Bruges speech in 1988), a Europe dedicated to opening markets, breaking down barriers to trade and retrenching both the ambitions and power of the EU’s supranational institutions.
It is almost unheard of for a visiting head of State to expressly go against the wishes of his host government on an official visit; and, given the sensitivity of the problems Brian Cowen’s government is dealing with, Klaus’ actions seem not just unhelpful but deliberately calculated to produce considerable political embarrassment for Cowen at a crucial juncture (The Irish government has pledged to provide the European Council with a roadmap for moving the Lisbon process forward at the December summit in Brussels). Scratching their heads last week Irish commentators could scarcely remember an occasion when a visiting head of State behaved in such an outrageous manner. Perhaps the nearest example that could be cited was the embarrassment caused by Russian president, Boris Yeltsin, when he failed to appear on the tarmac at Shannon Airport to greet then Taoiseach Albert Reynolds during a stopover visit in September 1994. At least Yeltsin had the excuse that he was blind drunk.
It is important to remember that Klaus is head of the Czech state and not head of government. He is thus the symbol of the Czech nation. Although the model is somewhat different to the Irish constitutional framework where the President is purely a ceremonial figure, heads of State are expected to adhere rigorously to the norms of diplomatic engagement, and in particular, to avoid any action that might encroach on domestic political sensibilities. Klaus’ decision, not only to meet but to hold a joint press conference with Libertas leader Declan Ganley went way beyond acceptable protocol. His martyrological depiction of Ganley as a “dissident” provoked rage in Iveagh House and sustained criticism from human rights campaigners who found the comparison with Soviet-era refusniks egregious to say the least. Ganley's business empire started with privatisation schemes throughout the former Eastern Bloc, before diversifying into operations that include no-bid Pentagon contracts - hardly the stuff of or the Helsinki Group.
For a visiting head of state Mr Klaus keeps strange company. His decision to accept a dinner invitation from Declan Ganley (venue: the well-chosen Constitution Room of the revamped Shelbourne Hotel) ensured he would rub shoulders with a ragtag band of Europe’s most nutcase politicos and self-aggrandizing hacks. The sheer strangeness of it all was summed up by Jason O’Mahoney in a letter to the Irish Times: “President Klaus believes climate change isn't happening but supports Nato, whilst Patricia McKenna thinks we're not doing enough to tackle climate change, and opposes Nato. Viscount De Villiers opposes free trade, whilst Mr Ganley worries about EU protectionism restricting free trade”. Pride of place among the local media cranksters were journalists Eamon Dunphy and Frank Fitzgibbon, the latter of whom revealed his abject ignorance of EU affairs (yet again) in his Sunday Times leading article on 16 November when he suggested that the Czech Republic would be the first post-communist state to hold the Presidency of the EU in the first half of 2009. In fact Slovenia became the first such state earlier this year. Oops! But, hey, when did empirical facts ever get in the way of the Sunday Times’ relentless efforts to distort and misrepresent the activities of the European Union?
The furore over Klaus’ wholly irresponsible behaviour does not occlude the obvious difficulties facing Brian Cowen as he contemplates how to approach next month’s European Council summit. The rejection of the Lisbon Treaty has presented the Irish Government with the most serious crisis in external relations since the Second World War. This was the third such referendum on Europe held in Ireland since the millennium and the second plebiscite in three to result in a rejection of an EU Treaty following the failed Nice poll in 2001. There is no obvious solution to the dilemma the Government faces as there seems no obvious pathway to achieve ratification. Although there has been relatively little public discussion up to now, behind the scenes diplomats have been working feverishly on different options for ratification of the Treaty. This is one reason why Klaus’ intervention at this juncture has been so frustrating for the Dublin government.
It seems obvious that any course of action which involves another referendum campaign involves significant risks for the Irish Government and for Ireland’s position within the European Union. The principal danger here stems from the ongoing knowledge deficit regarding EU affairs in Ireland: fully 42 per cent of respondents polled by Millward Brown in a government-commissioned research report into the June referendum cited ‘lack of knowledge/information/understanding’ as their reason for voting No to Lisbon.
Thus far the Irish government seems to be leaning in favour of a second referendum modelled on the Danish approach (after the failure in that country of the Maastricht referendum in 1992). Indeed officials from the department of Foreign Affairs visited Copenhagen in August to consult with Danish officials on possible solutions to the Irish problem. The type of clauses covered by this category of amendments to the Lisbon Treaty include a comprehensive reiteration of Irish neutrality, and possible opt outs for Ireland from the European Defence Agency, Euroatom, or even from the entire structure of EU defence arrangements per se. This approach could also extend to a clear legally-defined guarantee of Irish sovereignty over direct taxation. A referendum campaign revolving around one or other of these specifically-defined amendments would make it much more difficult for the No side to obfuscate and misrepresent the Treaty in a second campaign. It would focus attention on a much narrower range of concerns than was the case during the 2008 referendum by providing a bounded legal context for the proposed constitutional amendment.
But whilst this approach might provide the Government with a more ‘fireproofed’ amendment to place before the people, it also presents significant difficulties, both at EU level and domestically. There is significantly less goodwill in evidence toward Ireland now than there was previously and many member states deplore the idea of any further extension of the ‘pick and mix’ opt-out culture. The Danish experience also suggests that opt outs can prove damaging to the national interest in the medium to long term: exclusion from core decision-making institutions can lead to a member state’s being marginalized in some crucial policy areas.
I argue that the only viable option open to the Irish Government is to hold a second referendum on the substantive question of whether or not Ireland remains a member state of the EU. The first argument in favour of such an option is one of equity. Like it or not one cannot ignore the fact that on two occasions out of the last three Irish voters have said No to an EU Treaty. Assuming that ratification is completed by the end of 2008 in the 26 other member states, it is simply inconceivable that Ireland, with a population of less than 5 million EU citizens, can continue to block the introduction of a constitutional and institutional framework accepted by representatives of 495 million EU citizens. Once ratification is complete in the Czech Republic, Germany, Poland and Sweden, the pressure on Ireland to provide a solution to the Lisbon impasse will increase significantly as every other member state will have signalled that they accept the Lisbon rulebook. Simply put, to remain a member of the European Union Ireland will have to accept the Lisbon Treaty. In asking voters to endorse Ireland’s continued membership of the EU the proposition would also categorically imply an endorsement of Lisbon as the EU’s normative-institutional bedrock.
The most crucial factor in justifying such an ‘all or nothing’ referendum question, however, is that it brings back into play the significant economic dimension to Irish membership of the European Union, which has been marginalized in the three most recent referendums. It is not a coincidence that Irish citizens continue to be amongst the most supportive of the European Union: Membership has delivered structural funds and market access, modernization and prosperity, and, irrespective of current difficulties, most rational citizens understand that Ireland’s economic future is simply inconceivable outside of EU structures. Ireland has received net receipts of approximately €40 billion since 1973 and, in 2007 the state was still receiving a net amount of €500 million from the EU budget. When voters are reminded of this and the potentially catastrophic cost of being excluded not just from core Irish markets in the Single Market area but from the vital decision-making structures in the Council of Ministers and the European Central Bank to name just two of the most important, it reinforces what is at stake in a substantive decision to either remain or leave. In a sense one might argue that this would help to remove the scales that have been lingering around Irish eyes in recent referendums. The extraordinary implosion of global financial markets will almost certainly result in Ireland experiencing a more serious recession than envisaged even three months ago. Perversely this may work to the advantage of the Yes side in an ‘all or nothing’ referendum in that Ireland’s economic future cannot be contemplated seriously outside of EU structures. Indeed at the October European Council summit Michael Martin, the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs, explicitly stated his belief that Ireland would have gone the way of Iceland in recent weeks were it not for Irish membership of the EU and the Eurozone. Thus by re-focusing the question on Ireland’s economic well-being and appealing to the more material instincts of Irish citizens such a referendum stands the best chance of producing a solution to the EU’s protracted constitutional imbroglio. But the controversies surrounding Vaclav Klaus’ visit underline the bitterness and divisiveness generated by the June referendum and the difficult course Brian Cowen will have to steer in the months ahead.
For those who wish to re-engage with the Lisbon debate, and in particular with the importance of the EU to Ireland’s economic and political life, I recommend the newly published book by Brigid Laffan and Jane O’Mahoney, Ireland and the European Union (Palgrave MacMillan, €22.99). The book is very comprehensive in scope and highly readable. It Is destined to become the standard text on the subject in the years ahead.
John O’ Brennan lectures in European Politics at the National University of Ireland at Maynooth (NUIM). He is director of the Centre for the Study of Wider Europe (www.widereurope.ie ).
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Comments
"...it is simply inconceivable that Ireland, with a population of less than 5 million EU citizens, can continue to block the introduction of a constitutional and institutional framework accepted by representatives of 495 million EU citizens."
This formulation ignores the relative democratic values of the Irish No and the French or Dutch Yes (not to mention the yesses of the other European states). The EU constitution and its daughter treaty should have been put to a referendum across all EU states. Had the majority of the other 495 million citizens votes Yes, then truly we could not sustain a negative position. However, the Lisbon Treaty is, in fact, a shameful retreat into elitism, couched in language which makes a patronising 'we know best' attitude inevitable.
The argument that grattitude should prevail is akin to suggesting that turkeys should vote for Christmas because they have been well-fed for a year.
In fact very many EU citizens are grateful to Ireland for its stance (I mean the stance of the people), since they have not been given the opportunity to vote. There has been much criticism here of the American Electoral College system, where, for example, a so-called faithless elector can put a president into power despite the will of his electorate. However, the present system (and proposed system) in Europe is similar. No matter what the people say, the governments are in a position to go their own sweet way.
The suggestion that voting No to Lisbon means 'leaving' is spurious. Nobody wants to leave. What we want is a different treaty.